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Informed Consent 
Dennis J. Horan and Patrick Halligan 
Portions of this paper repeat and otherwise rely heavily on Mr. 
Horan's (1975 and revised 1976) article "Authority for Medical Treat-
ment: Consent" in Medical Malpractice, a handbook published by the 
Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 2395 W. Jefferson 
Blvd., Springfield, Illinois and reproduced here with their permission. 
Introduction 
There occur disputes between physicians and their patients in 
which an attempted cure not only does not succeed but also aggra-
vates the condition of ill-being of the patient despite skillful imple-
mentation of the technique or method of cure. The aggravation 
usually surprises the patient in a bitter way. The aggravation is called a 
side effect or collateral effect. The bitterness of the surprise some-
times creates a complaint that the physician knew the side effect was 
possible and did not tell the patient. The plaintiff then suggests that 
he would or might not have taken the cure had he been informed of 
the possible side effect and so would, incidentally, not have suffered 
the "injury." These disappointments crystallize in the allegation that 
the physician did not obtain informed consent to the cure. Provision-
ally then, lack of informed consent is a doctrine about liability for 
side effects of touching by a physician which happen despite manual 
skill. 
Consent for treatment has always been recognized by medical 
practitioners as an essential element in their relationship to the patient 
and a necessary requirement conditioning the imposition of hands 
for purposes of healing. With this the law agreed , a lack of authoriza-
tion to any touching having rightfully been considered a battery [Pratt 
v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300,79 N.E. 562 (1906)]. 
In its early days, medicine was much more paternalistic than it is 
now. As a consequence, consent was more readily assumed or, more 
correctly, less readily denied under the concept of "doctor knows 
best." The doctrine of informed consent had its genesis in certain 
early 20th century battery cases, but really began in 1957 with the 
case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 
Cal. app. 2d 560, 317 P2d 170 (1957) . 
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In recent years the law has focused on the quality of the consent. 
Where the consent was given, but knowledge of the collateral risks 
withheld , the consent is said to be vitiated because not informed. 
Thus, there has arisen a new cause of action generally called a lack of 
informed c;onsent [79 A.L.R. 2d 1028]. 
Whether this new cause of action sounds in battery or negligence 
has been debated, and the debate has not been entirely settled to this 
date. A majority of the courts has decided that the action is one of 
negligence and expert testimony is necessary [52 A.L.R. 3d 1084]. 
However, a distinct and strong minority maintains that the action can 
be either negligence or battery and that oftentimes expert testimony, 
although necessary for certain aspects of the case, may not be neces-
sary on the issue of whether or not the consent is informed [Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,791 (D.C . Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 
Cal. 3d 229,502 P 2d 1 (1972)] . Each of these issues will be discussed 
in detail hereafter. 
A majority of the courts has concluded that the doctrine of 
informed consent creates a cause of action in professional negligence 
against a physician when, although there may be on the surface no 
negligence in the treatment, (1) there is a collateral side effect to 
treatment (common knowledge risks such as infection excluded) or, as 
it is commonly called, a "bad result"; and (2) the physician failed to 
properly warn the patient of that possibility when securing the con-
sent; and (3) the physician failed to advise the patient of alternative 
modes of treatment, if any [Louisell and Williams, Medical Malprac-
tice (Matthew Bender, 1974), Ch. 22, pp. 594.43-594.64; Waltz and 




Whether and to what extent the doctrine is applicable to a hospital 
as distinct from a physician is not at all clear at the present time. 
Normally hospital personnel perform an administrative function by 0 b-
taining the signature of a patient to a consent form, whereas the discus-
sion of the medical or operative procedure is done by the staff physician 
or surgeon. Consequently, hospitals are usually not involved in informed 
consent cases unless the hospital employees, such as an employed 
(not an independent contractor) radiologist or pathologist is involved 
in obtaining the consent or giving the treatment. See, e.g., Ze Barth v. 
Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P2d 1, 52 
A.L.R. 3d 1067 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1972); Stivers v. George Washington 
Univ. 320 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see dicta in Fiorentino v. 
Wenger 19 N.Y.2d 407,418,227 N.E.2d 296, 301280 N.Y.S. 2d 373, 
381 (1967) and Ohligschlager v. Proctor Memorial Hospital 6 III App. 
2d 81. 
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Battery 
The law treats actions against physicians where consent has not 
been obtained prior to treatment as batteries. Three such cases are 
illustrative. From these cases eventually arose the doctrine of lack of 
informed consent or as we shall refer to it hereafter, informed con-
sent. Much confusion exists about the nature of this cause of action 
and its essential elements. Some historical analysis is necessary in 
order to avoid the confusion and clarify the necessary elements of an 
informed consent case. 
The most influential decision appears to be Mohr v. Williams, 95 
Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) . In Mohr, the plaintiff consented to 
an operation on the right ear. At surgery, the defendant physician 
determined that the culprit was really the left ear and so operated on 
it instead. The trial court award plaintiff damages for the unauthor-
ized operation and the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, reject-
ing the defense arguments that (1) no consent was necessary since the 
surgery was necessary and beneficial to the plaintiff; (2) there was no 
intent to harm; and (3) consent can be inferred. Citing the lower court 
Pratt opinion, infra, the Mohr court spoke of every citizen's first and 
greatest right, which underlies all others - "the right to the invio-
lability of his person," which no surgeon, no matter how eminent or 
skillful, may violate without consent. 
In Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906), the defendant 
physician performed two operations on the plaintiff, ultimately 
removing her uterus and ovaries. The court found that neither the 
woman nor her husband had consented to the operation and affirmed 
an award of compensatory and exemplary damages. The defense 
arguments were substantially similar to those in Mohr. Rejecting these, 
the Pratt court concluded that absent an emergency, "consent should 
be a prerequisite to a surgical operation" [224 Ill. 300,305]. 
Pratt v. Davis was followed by the Oklahoma case of Rolater v. 
Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1913) (unauthorized removal of 
bone in foot), and both were followed by the case which contains the 
classic statement on this issue. In Schloendorff v. Society of New 
York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (Ct. Appl. N.Y. 1914), 
Justice Cardozo in affirming a judgment against the defendant 
physician for unauthorized surgery said: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is 
liable in damages. 
Each of these courts spoke of the novelty of the issue and each 
followed the lead of the Illinois Appellate Court in Pratt. They used 
traditional tort analysis relying on horn book law involving unauthor-
ized touching which constitutes a battery. The defenses were posed 
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and argued on that basis, offering implied consent or privilege to 
touch or no intent to harm as vitiating factors. The notion of implied 
consent is a notion of actual consent implied in fact. It differs greatly 
from informed consent. 
The Initiation of the New Tort 
of Lack of Informed Consent 
The next phase of the informed consent confusion began in 1957 
with the statements made by the court in the now famous case of 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. 
App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) . 
In Salgo, the court defined the physician 's duty to his patient as 
such that he violates the duty" ... if he withholds any facts which are 
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to 
the proposed treatment." This definition constituted a substantial 
change in the law since, unlike the cases discussed previously, it 
assumed that actual consent to touch was given, but concentrated on 
the facts surrounding the consent to determine whether or not the 
consent was knowingly given. Salgo involved an aortograph procedure 
which resulted in paralysis. The complaint sounded in negligence and 
the court instructed on negligence. Although not altogether clear, the 
doctrine of informed consent seemed not to be a theory of battery, 
but the court did not attempt to abrogate prior decisions that where 
no consent was given a battery was committed. That is, the court 
initiated a new tort whose remedies cumulate with older forms and 
did not abolish technical battery. 
One obvious difference between the battery theory and the Salgo 
theory is the necessity for expert testimony. Where no consent what-
ever is given, the case becomes a traditional battery case. If a battery 
analysis is used, the case may go to the jury on the testimony of the 
plaintiff alone, without testimony concerning the standard of care in 
the medical community. In addition, the applicable statutes of limita-
tions may vary greatly in some jurisdictions, as do the insurance 
problems. Is the Salgo theory a negligence theory or a constructive 
deceit model or is it sui generis? 
A Kansas opinion in 1960 highlighted the difficulties in understand-
ing this new cause of action. Nathanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 
P.2d 1093, reh. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). Ulti-
mately, the Kansas court decided that the action sounded in negli-
gence. 
The court of appeals of Arizona in 1965 discussed the issue 
referring to the continuing confusion between negligence and battery 
and concluded that the action lies in either. The court's summarizing 
statement is a classic of the confusion the courts have faced in 
analyzing this hybrid cause of action (409 P .2d p . 86) : 
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Summarizing, we hold that a consent to a surgical procedure is effected if 
the consenter understands substantially the nature of the surgical procedure 
attempted and the probable results of the operation. This, as a matter of 
law, constitutes an informed consent. Lacking this, the operation is a 
battery unless some special exception pertains. Given an informed consent, 
liability, if any, must be predicated in malpractice. In malpractice, the duty 
of the physician to disclose is determined by the normal practices of his 
profession in the particular community. We do not attempt to determine 
the law in the case of particularly dangerous operations, when some courts 
have ruled as a matter of law that disclosure must be made. Nathanson u. 
Kline, supra, and Mitchell u. Robinson, supra. If it is found that the 
standard of disclosure has been breached in the particular case, and if injury 
has resulted therefrom, then there is liability in malpractice. Whether there 
was sufficient evidence in this case, arising from the testimony of the 
defendant-doctor or otherwise, to go to the jury on the question of whether 
the defendant-doctor breached a duty to disclose we need not decide 
because there is no showing here that the failure to disclose resulted in the 
plaintiff's unfortunate condition. 
Negligence or Malpractice 
The earliest statement of the cause of action in its present form in 
other than an American jurisdiction occurred in a Canadian case. In 
Kenny v. Lockwood, 1932, Onto Rptr_ 141, the court stated that in 
the matter of providing or not providing information, it is the obliga-
tion of a physician to "exercise skill" in giving and withholding advice. 
The relationship which creates the obligation, i.e., the source of duty, 
is the relation of patient and physician. The court rejected the charac-
terization of the relationship as that of a fiduciary and confiding 
person and thoroughly rejected any preconceived policy favoring full 
disclosure_ The source of the standard of disclosure is the medical 
profession_ The members of the profession must conform to the stan-
dards of the profession but need not give more or less information 
than competent physicians give_ A plaintiff in Ontario must prove 
these standards by expert testimony_ Physicians sometimes have a 
privilege to conceal information in order to induce the patient to take 
a course of treatment he might otherwise refuse. 
This "privilege" is not an unmitigated boon to medical doctors_ 
Where the obligation is to use skill in disclosing and withholding 
information, there may be liability not only for some reservations of 
information but also for disclosure which creates emotional or other 
harm [Menehan V. Williams, 379 P. 2d 292 at 294]. See also, Ferrara V. 
Gallucio, 152 N.E. 2d 249, a 1958 New York case. 
The privilege found by the court in Kenny is not merely a defense 
or justification which the defense may assert affirmatively. RatJ:ler, the 
absence of the therapeutic reason or custom must be proved by plain-
tiff. The privilege is not, to use traditional pleading terms, a bar but a 
no-claim rule, absence of the therapeutic rationale being an element of 
the plaintiff's proof. 
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As is illustrated in the case discussion hereafter, most American 
courts have maintained that the cause of action for informed consent 
sounds in negligence. For example, an analysis of one jurisdiction 
which has accepted the negligence or malpractice model would be 
appropriate at this time to illustrate the many unanswered questions 
that still remain, even after that threshold is crossed. 
In Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E. 2d 156 (1970), 
the court ruled that because the lack of informed consent problem 
allegedly involved concerned matters which were not of common 
knowledge or within the experience of laymen, that expert testimony 
was just as necessary as in any other medical malpractice case. The 
court affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the defendant at the 
close of the plaintiffs case because the plaintiff did not present expert 
testimony on the standard of care with regard to obtaining consents in 
the community. 
The Green case involved a post-operation series of cobalt and x-ray 
treatments on the plaintiff which, it is alleged, damaged her severely. 
She alleged that although she had given consent for a biopsy and 
mastectomy, no consent either written or oral or implied had been 
obtained for the radiation therapy. In addition, she had not been 
advised of the collateral risks involved in x-ray and cobalt therapy. 
Mrs. Green denied any consent to the radiation therapy. On the 
basis of that testimony, some courts would allow the case to go to the 
jury on a battery theory. However, the inappropriateness of this is 
easily seen when one considers that some form of consent had to be 
implied or Mrs. Green would not have taken the successive cobalt 
treatments. She obviously was not forced under a machine to receive 
the treatment. Consequently, analyzing the case as one involving a 
lack of informed consent is more appropriate under the circumstances. 
Since there was no expert evidence of what the reasonable physician 
in the same community, under similar circumstances, would disclose 
regarding the risks and hazards of radiation therapy, the court 
affirmed the directed verdict. 
More importantly, but almost unnoticed in the opinion, is the issue 
of proximate cause on which the court also indicated that there was 
an absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. Proximate cause is an 
extremely important issue in a lack of informed consent case. It 
requires that the plaintiff prove that she would not have undergone 
the treatment if she had known of the collateral risk. The weight of 
authority seems to indicate that such a test should be an objective one 
as is the prudent man test, which leaves the issue to be determined by 
the jury rather than a subjective test relying solely upon her testimony 
[Holstrom, Informed Consent: Alternatives, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 
739-756]. In any event, her testimony to that effect becomes an essen-
tial part of the cause of action. 
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The Green case teaches that Illinois accepts the majority position 
requiring expert testimony in informed consent cases. However, other 
issues remain unresolved. It is possible under some circumstances to 
avoid the necessity of expert testimony. If so, what might the circum-
stances be? What is the appropriate standard for proximate cause, the 
objective or subjective test? See note: Informed Consent -A Proposed 
Standard for Medical Disclosure, N.Y.U.L.Rev. 548-563 (1973). What 
are the defenses to such an action? What is the materiality of the risk 
that must be disclosed? What are the damages allowable in such an 
action? For example, if the operation is performed with all due care, 
but a collateral risk not entirely unexpected results and the risk was 
not disclosed, should the physician be liable for all of the damages 
involved in the risk? Since the cause of action involved the subjective 
knowledge of the plaintiff, what is the applicable statute of limita-
tions? 
If Illinois or, for that matter, any state had analyzed the informed 
consent tort on a negligence theory and answered all of the 
unanswered questions the tort would resemble the following: 
1. There must first exist the relationship of physician and patient 
for the purpose of rendering and receiving treatment. Out of this 
relationship the duty to disclose arises. 
2. The physician must recommend to the patient a certain form of 
treatment about which he knows the existence of certain risks 
which occur in a statistically determinable number of cases with-
out reference to due care. 
3. The known risk must be a material one which means that it is not 
trivial nor one such as infection which may be an incidence of all 
procedures. 
4. The physician must inadvertently neglect to tell the patient about 
the collateral risk. He can do so by either neglecting to say any-
thing at all or by giving too little information or incorrect infor-
mation. In any event, the patient has not received adequate 
enough information about the risk to capably assess the prob-
lems he may incur if he opts for this treatment. 
5. Divulging the particular risk must be in accordance with com-
munity medical standards. That is, the standard in this medical 
community is that the particular risk is ordinarily revealed to the 
pati~nt. 
6. There must be no emergency situation since an emergency will <c 
excuse the necessity for consent, the law presuming that in such 
circumstances the patient would have consented. 
7. There exists an alternative treatment which would have avoided 
the risk. If the physician reveals the risk but not the alternative 
treatment, an action in lack of informed consent could still lie. 
Consequently both the risk and the alternative treatment must be ... 
revealed and discussed. 
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8. However, even if no alternative treatment existed, the risk must 
still be revealed or an action may lie. This is so since the physi-
cian's duty requires obtaining consent and the patient has the 
option to refuse all or any treatment. This last point may seem to 
confuse the application of the medical community standard, but 
nonetheless, it remains true and is the source of much of the 
confusion in the conflicting opinions which are discussed here-
after. Consumer-oriented courts which consider this action to be 
one in the nature of misrepresentation or deceit see the creation 
of the applicable standard of care arising from the point of view 
of the patient who is the consumer of the service. They begin 
with the premise that the patient has an absolute right to know 
the nature and risks of the treatment. This type of analysis leads 
to a great deal of confusion since it deals with tort concepts in 
absolutes. If correct, it would mean that medical judgment would 
never be a consideration. No court has gone that far. To do so 
would seem to be unreasonable. However, these consumer-
oriented attitudes playa great part in close cases in determining 
whether expert testimony is necessary. Obviously, a balancing of 
these competing interests is the only appropriate way to handle 
the problem. Revelation of the risk is preferred but medical 
judgment cannot be left out of the problem. Medical community 
standards should control. The standard of revelation should be 
the standards ordinarily followed by the medical community. In 
rare instances and where necessary, courts and legislatures can 
impose reasonable standards on the medical community. 
9. Expert testimony is required to prove: 
A. the incidence and thus the materiality of the risk; 
B. the medical standard of revelation in the community; 
C. the deviation from the standard by the hypothetical physician 
in this case; 
D. the nature of the injury received by the existence of the risk 
and its causal connection to the procedure; 
E. the available alternative treatment, if any. 
10. The plaintiff may testify that he would have rejected the treat-
ment or selected another treatment if informed of the risk but 
such testimony is not binding on the court and jury even if not 
contradicted. This is the so-called subjective standard of proof. 
11. The jury decides the case based on an objective standard of a 
prudent man. The jury determines what an ordinarily prudent 
patient would have done under similar circumstances. The con-
duct of that prudent person under the circumstances revealed by 
the testimony, including the expert testimony, becomes the 
norm by which the trier of fact assesses fault. The jury must 
decide that, but for the lack of knowledge, the patient would 
have foregone the risk. 
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12. The physician can affirmatively prove that, for this particular 
patient, revelation of the risk was contra-indicated. This may be a 
defense even if the standard is violated, but it should be con-
sidered only an affirmative defense, the weight of which is left to 
the trier of fact. There are two ways of speaking of therapeutic 
privilege. In the broad sense it means a physician's privilege to 
withhold the type of information which all physicians in the 
community withhold. In its narrow sense, it refers to the exercise 
of that physician's medical judgment in this particular case. The 
courts use the expression in both these senses. 
13. Damages should be the monetary measure of the difference 
between the patient's condition with no treatment and his con-
dition after the undisclosed risk materialized. 
14. Punitive damages should not ordinarily be allowed. 
15. The burden of proof of nondisclosure rests with the plaintiff. 
The burden of proof of deviation from the community standard 
rests with the plaintiff. The burden of justification rests with the 
physicians. That burden can be established if the physician can 
show that the patient told him that he did not want to be 
informed, or that the procedure was simple and the danger 
remote and commonly appreciated to be remote, or that the 
disclosure would have seriously upset the patient's health, or that 
something less than full disclosure was warranted under the cir-
cumstances of the case. 
Defenses 
Whether the action is treated as one sounding in battery or negli-
gence makes an important difference in what defenses are available. 
The traditional defenses to a battery suit are privilege, consent, 
implied consent, self defense, apparent necessity, and use of reason-
able force. 
As explained by the court in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 
P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972) in referring to the defenses to 
a negligence action: 
Whenever appropriate the court should instruct the jury on the defenses 
available to a doctor who has failed to make the disclosure required by law. 
Thus, a medical doctor need not make disclosure risks when the patient 
requests that he not be so informed . ... Such a disclosure need not be made 
if the procedure is simple and the danger remote and commonly appreciated 
to be remote. A disclosure need not be made beyond that required within 
the medical community when a doctor can prove by preponderance of the 
evidence he relied upon facts which would demonstrate to a reasonable man 
the disclosure would have so seriously upset the patient that the patient 
would not have been able to dispassionately waive the. risks of refusing to 
undergo the recommended treatment. 
Additional defenses as outlined in Canterbury v. Spence talk in 
terms of the physician's privilege not to disclose. The first involves an 
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unconscious patient or one incapable of consenting where treatment is 
immediately necessary. This is usually described as the emergency 
exception. The second involves the situation where the risk disclosure 
poses a threat to the well-being of the patient. However, the burden is 
always on the doctor to satisfy the jury that something less than 
revelation was good medicine. 
Proximate causation or causal connection is another extremely 
important defense. This defense exists when, but only when, dis-
closure of significant risks incidental to treatment would not have 
resulted in a decision against the treatment. 
Another defense is that the medical community standard has not 
been violated. 
When Is a Risk Material? 
To establish a breach of duty on the part of the physician, plain-
tiff's counsel must show that there existed a duty to disclose and there 
was not adequate information given by the physician to fulfill that 
duty. What constitutes adequate or sufficient information under these 
circumstances is extremely difficult to say. The courts have created 
numerous roles indicating, generally speaking, that the information 
must relate sufficient knowledge of the materiality of the risk involved 
so that the patient can make a knowledgeable judgment as to the 
alternative treatment or rejection of treatment. 
There must first exist knowledge on the part of the physician that a 
risk is involved. If he did not have such knowledge, then an additional 
question can be involved: namely, whether or not he should have had 
such knowledge. The standard on that question is the normal standard 
in the community as in any malpractice case. 
There must be a duty to disclose the risk, which obviously means 
that the patient involved must be the one capable of giving the con-
sent, so that we must be talking about an adult patient of sound mind. 
The duty to disclose must exist in the light of the medical condition 
of the patient so that the disclosure does not harm the patient. Where 
this would be the case, then there obviously would be no duty to 
disclose. So, too, in risks that are commonly known to occur, no duty 
exists. For example, there is no duty on the part of a physician to 
reveal that an infection can be possible as a result of a particular 
operation, even though infection does occur in perhaps two to three 
percent of such cases. 
The disclosure must be of a material risk, that is a risk which, if 
known to the patient, would have deterred the patient from under-
going the treatment. Obviously this is a very difficult medical question 
which must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and no general rule can 
be stated other than that the physician should be careful and use good 
medical judgment in deciding what risks he should reveal. In this age 
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of defensive medicine because of medical malpractice suits, the 
propensity is to over-reveal the risks rather than under-reveal. Perhaps 
this is better, and in the long run will prove more beneficial to the 
practice of medicine. 
The risk, if revealed, must be one that would deter {he patient from 
the procedure. This means that the patient would have rejected the 
treatment altogether if he knew of the risk. To even state that proposi· 
tion is to show how absurd it can be in practical application. The issue 
of lack of informed consent would not even arise if there had not been 
an untoward result. Under those circumstances hindsight dictates that 
the patient would subjectively conclude that he would not have under-
taken the treatment if he knew what he was going to suffer. For this 
reason the courts have rejected a subjective test and have supplanted it 
with an objective test. 
In Cobbs u. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P. 2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 
(1972), the California Supreme Court opted for the objective test, 
saying this: 
The patient-plaintiff may testify on this subject, but the issue extends 
beyond his credibility. Since at the time of the trial the uncommunicated 
hazard has materialized, it will be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not 
claim that he had been informed of the dangers he would have declined 
treatment. Subjectively he may believe so, with the 20{20 vision of hind-
sight, but we doubt that justice will be served by placing the physician in 
jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective 
test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position 
have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils. 
Another case that has discussed the standard is Canterbury u. 
Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Canterbury court is in a 
very distinct minority since its approach to informed consent is that 
the standard is oftentimes a non-medical judgment and, if so, does not 
require the specialized treatment under the law which necessitates 
expert testimony. The Canterbury court says that "all risks potentially 
affecting the decision must be unmasked." The law sets the standard, 
and "if, but only if, the fact finder can say that the physician's com-
munication was unreasonably inadequate is an imposition of liability 
legally or morally justified." 
The Canterbury court found: 
The scope of the standard is not subjective as to either the physician or the 
patient; it remains objective with due regard for the patient's informational 
needs and with suitable leeway for the physician's situation. 
In what could almost be an instruction on this issue the Canterbury 
court, in quoting from Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed Consent to 
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 639·40 (1970), stated: 
A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician 
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not 
to forego the proposed therapy. 
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In determining the nature of the informed consent cause of action 
in any jurisdiction, resort must first be had to the common law cases. 
Thereafter the statute should be reviewed to determine its effect on 
the nature of the action. 
When we sp~ak of a misrepresentation or consumer model, we refer 
to the fact that certain jurisdictions see the origin of the applicable 
standard of revelation to exist as a right of the consuming public to 
know, rather than as a duty upon the physician to reveal, determined 
by medical community standards. Subjective reliance refers to the 
state of mind of the plaintiff, the issue whether and, i.f so, to what 
extent the court will entertain the plaintiff's self-serving testimony on 
this point. 
By objective materiality we mean the objective test or standard of 
the prudent patient acting under similar circumstances which is the 
objective standard to be applied by the jury. 
Doctors' Meditation 
Albert S. Axelrad 
May I remain ever mindful of the high ideals to which I chose 
to dedicate my life through the practice of medicine. As my 
effectiveness impinges on the life and death of my patients, let 
me retain alertness and competence, while remaining current in 
my field. In the face of abundant pressures, let me apportion 
my time and give of myself wisely. As I treat people with 
serious illness, may I remember always that my patients are 
persons and not merely cases, that they are human beings with 
feelings and not only diseased organisms. Let me treat their 
maladies with proficiency and them with empathy and compas-
sion, sensitivity and understanding, remembering how frighten-
ing and disorienting are sickness and surgery. Let me be sensi-
tive to my patients' anxiety over tests and hospitals. May my 
doctoring represent the noblest of combinations - medical 
excellence and human kindness. 
Rabbi Albert S. Axelrad is the chaplain and Hillel director at Brandeis 
University, Waltham, Mass. In recent years, he has become considerably 
involved in medically related issues, e.g., the hospice movement. 
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